

## **Chaplain-CDID Synopsis, FM 3-0, Operations (Change 01), DEC17**

**Purpose:** Provide an overview of FM 3-0 and potential impact for Religious Support (RS) plans, training, and execution. Significant portions of this document are reproductions of FM 3-0 or paraphrased summations of FM 3-0. The RS implications paragraphs are unique to this author's interpretation of FM 3-0 RS considerations. Each chapter summation is preceded by RS implications.

The summation of Appendix A is a discussion regarding command and support relationships in the context of RS. Consequently, there is no listing of RS implications for Appendix A. Appendix B is a list of questions for commanders and staffs to examine in order to mitigate risk. One question applies specifically to the special staff while the remainder apply to the entire staff.

**Impact Summary:** Religious support (RS) personnel assigned to formations in an Army tasked with providing joint force commanders operationally significant and sustained land power must train, prepare, and assess individual and collective readiness to provide religious support to forces engaged in large-scale combat operations. This requires relearning Army-wide neglected tasks, operating in austere and isolated environments, handling casualty rates on scale with WWII historical rates, and operating in an environment with unmatched complexity, lethality, ambiguity, and speed while fighting a peer adversary. FM 3-0 outlines the capabilities needed to fight and win in this environment. Concurrently, chaplain sections and UMTs need to analyze and understand the commander's intent, FM 3-0, unit training plans, RS training plans, and ongoing opportunities for training during phase 0 in order to ensure RS personnel are prepared to rapidly deploy and provide RS at echelon across the full range of military operations matching the Army's lethality with relevant, integrated, and effective religious support.

## Introduction

Whereas the Army focused upon counterinsurgency and stability operations due to a view that large-scale combat operations against a peer threat were unlikely, emerging threats from Russia, China, North Korea, and Iran indicate an increasing likelihood of Large-scale Combat Operations (LSCO). Alongside this emerging threat is the realization that all domains are simultaneously involved in the conduct of combat operations; Air, Land, Maritime, Space, and the Information Environment (includes Cyber). This requires synchronization of the elements of combat power; Mission Command, Movement and Maneuver, Intelligence, Fires, Sustainment, Protection, Leadership, and Information.

FM 3-0, *Operations*, describes how Army forces defeat a peer threat using current force structure and capabilities. It discusses the Army's strategic roles as an organizing construct and describes how Army forces contribute to joint operations. In addition, FM 3-0:

- Modifies the Army's operational framework by **adding a consolidation area** to the deep, close, and support area operational framework. **It also adds the joint security area, strategic support area, and deep fires area.**
- Adds physical, temporal, cognitive, and virtual considerations to the operational framework to account for a multi-domain environment.
- Emphasizes the importance of preparation and training for large-scale combat operations **across warfighting functions.**
- Recognizes the importance of operations to achieve **strategic goals (win) short of armed conflict.**
- Emphasizes the roles of echelons, initiative, and maneuver against enemies employing **anti-access and area denial** operational approaches.
- Describes **corps and divisions as formations** (headquarters employing subordinate unit capabilities) rather than just headquarters.
- Emphasizes the importance of **consolidating gains** to exploit positions of relative advantage and achieve enduring favorable outcomes.
- Establishes a **support area command post** for corps and division headquarters.

## Chapter One – Overview of Army Operations

### RS Implications:

- Chaplain sections/UMTs need to thoroughly understand the operational framework for their respective AO +/- two levels in either direction.
- The deep, close, support area, and consolidation areas each impact priorities for the maneuver and support units as well as convey potentiality for freedom of movement within the area. This directly impacts RS delivery across the area in terms of movement and priorities of RS for the supported units.
- Training, coordination, and delivery of RS begins at home station in Phase 0.
- The identification of decisive, shaping, and sustaining, as well as demarcation of main and supporting efforts communicates priorities of support and potential for increased RS requirements or anticipated RS demands.
- Chaplains and religious affairs specialists need to understand the priorities of effort within each phase of operations and be prepared to provide RS along a spectrum of priorities due to fluid transitions across the range of military operations within the spectrum of conflict.
- Area coverage includes all assigned, attached, or TACON/OPCON forces. Building unity of effort and cross-communication with limited movement and communication is essential for effectively coordinated RS for all personnel in a given AO. This also requires that RS personnel maintain situational awareness of RS assets within a given AO as well as units operating without readily available RS assets due to movement restrictions. This ensures coverage of collocated units, teams, and authorized civilian personnel.
- RS personnel need to consider all six domains in terms of impacts upon RS delivery as well as modes of delivering RS.






Figure 1-3. Notional large-scale combat joint phasing model



+Figure 1-4. Army strategic roles and their relationships to joint phases

The Army conducts operations as part of the joint force in four broad categories; operations to shape, operations to deter, LSCO, and operations to consolidate gains. Operations to deter and shape succeed when adversaries are denied the ability to destabilize or subvert a friendly state. LSCOs succeed when we destroy or defeat conventional means of resistance. Operations to consolidate gains capitalize on LSCO gains and ensure strategic purposes are achieved.

Expeditionary capabilities begin with a mindset that pervades the force. Forward deployed units, forward positioned capabilities, and force projection – from anywhere in the world – contribute to the Army’s expeditionary capabilities. Divisions and corps are the lowest echelons capable of orchestrating multi-domain capabilities during LSCOs.



**Close area** – the area within a commander’s AO assigned to subordinate maneuver units. [Current decisive operations in this area with rapid maneuver capabilities.]

**Deep area** – the portion of a commander’s AO not assigned to subordinate units. [Sets conditions for success in the close area or for future operations.]

**Support Area** – the portion of a commander’s AO designed to facilitate the positioning, employment, and protection of base sustainment assets required to sustain, enable, and control operations. [Essentially, permits sustainment units to focus on primary functions with minimal adversarial harassment.]

**Consolidation area** – portion of the commander’s AO designated to facilitate the security and stability tasks necessary for freedom of action in the close area and to support the continuous consolidation of gains. Often contains the support area, but not necessarily. [A unit one level below the HQs is assigned responsibility for the consolidation area; e.g., a BCT is assigned an AO synonymous with the consolidation area for a Division.]

### Categories of Operations:

**Decisive** – the operations that directly accomplished the mission. It is the focal point around which commanders design an entire operation.

**Shaping** – establishes conditions for the decisive operation.

**Sustaining** – operation at any echelon that enables the decisive or shaping operations by generating and maintaining combat power.

## Main and Supporting Efforts:

**Main** – a designated subordinate unit whose mission at a given point in time is most critical to overall mission success; it receives priority of support and resources.


**Supporting** – a designated subordinate unit with a mission that supports the success of the main effort.

## Sequencing Operations:

Phasing is a way to view and conduct operations in manageable parts. A phase represents a period during which a large number of forces are involved in similar activities.

**Branches** – contingency plans built into the basic plan, creates flexibility by anticipating enemy reactions.

**Sequels** – subsequent operations based upon possible outcomes



“The operational framework has four components. First, commanders are assigned an area of operations (AO) for the conduct of operations, from which, in turn, they assign AOs to subordinate units. Units should be assigned AOs commensurate with their ability to influence what happens within them. Second, within their assigned AOs, commanders can designate deep, close, support, and consolidation areas to describe the physical arrangement of forces in time, space, and purpose. Depending upon the echelon and mission, commanders may not need to assign a deep or consolidation area. Third, within an AO, commanders conduct decisive, shaping, and

sustaining operations to accomplish missions. Finally, commanders designate main and supporting efforts to designate the shifting and prioritization of resources.” (para 1-121)

**Area of Responsibility (AOR)** – established by the Unified Campaign Plan and defines geographic responsibilities for a Geographic Combatant Commander (GCC). AOR should not be confused with other operational area terms such as theater of operations or AO. Only a GCC is assigned an AOR. **All U.S. forces within an AOR (assigned, attached, operational control, or in transit through the region) fall under the control of that GCC for as long as they remain in the AOR.**

When assigning AOs, each headquarters ensures its subordinate headquarters' capabilities align with their span of control and missions.

The AO encompasses 5 domains:

- Air
- Land
- Maritime
- Space
- Information (includes Cyber)

## **Chapter Two – Army Echelons, Capabilities, and Training**

### **RS Implications:**

- Understanding the roles of echelons and their priorities is essential to effective coordination and delivery of RS.
- Realization that task-organization impacts delivery and coordination of RS creates both understanding and flexibility in generating and implementing solutions.
- Mission command drives the operations process and RS assets need to understand the mission command processes, systems, and platforms in order to effectively integrate seamless RS at echelon across the range of military operations. (The orders process drives official tasking.)
- Training requires rigorous and realistic training driven and guided by the unit's METL (Core and Assigned) and the design outlined in ADRP and FM 7-0.
- As a function of sustainment, RS personnel need to consider core skills essential for delivery of RS in an austere environment with conventional and hybrid threats whereby sustainment assets are considered high payoff targets (HPTs).

### **Army Echelons, Capabilities, and Training:**

As the Nation's decisive land force, the Army provides a mix of headquarters, units, and capabilities to geographic combatant commanders (GCCs) in support of a theater campaign plan (TCP) and specific joint operations. This mix comes from echeloned arrays of headquarters and trained capabilities.

### **Army Forces in a Theater:**

The **Theater army** is the senior Army headquarters in an AOR, and it consists of the commander, staff, and all Army forces assigned to a combatant command. Its operational responsibilities include command of forces, direction of operations, and control of assigned AOs. Its administrative responsibilities encompass the Service-specific requirements for equipping, sustaining, training, unit readiness, discipline, and personnel matters. This headquarters also functions as the Army Service component command (ASCC) of the GCC.

An ASCC provides the following functions:

- Executing the GCC's daily operational requirements
- Setting the theater
- Setting the joint operations area (JOA)
- Serving as the joint task force (JTF) or joint force land component for crisis response and limited contingency operations

The Theater Army provides the following functions:

- Serving as the primary interface between DA, Army commands, and other ASCCs
- Developing Army plans to support the TCP within an AOR
- Tailoring Army forces for employment in the AOR
- Controlling reception, staging, onward movement, and integration (RSOI) for Army forces in an AOR
- Exercising OPCON of deployed Army forces not subordinated to a Joint Force Commander (JFC)
- Exercising administrative control (ADCON) of all Army forces operating within the AOR
- Providing support as directed by the GCC to unified action partners
- Exercising OPCON of all joint forces attached to it as either a joint force land component headquarters or JTF headquarters, as required by the GCC.

The Theater army will likely receive further theater enabling commands/units in order to adequately support the TCP.

These might include commands in theater sustainment, signal, medical, civil affairs, air defense, military police, engineer, aviation, and brigades in psychological operations, military intelligence, and chemical. (See attached figure)




Figure 2-2. Example of a theater army organization for large-scale combat operations




Figure 2-3. Possible tactical corps task organization

Large-scale combat operations may require a **corps headquarters** to function as a tactical land headquarters under a joint of multinational land component command. A corps is normally the senior Army headquarters deployed to a JOA. It commands Army and multinational forces in campaigns and major operations.

Key Functions of a Corps in LSCO:

- Conduct shaping operations within the corps AO
- Task-organize and employ divisions and brigades
- Integrate and synchronize operations of divisions and brigades
- Mass effects at decisive points
- Allocate resources and set priorities
- Leverage joint capabilities

A **division headquarters** is organized, trained, and equipped to command the operations of two to five BCTs. Divisions are typically task organized with a combination of armored, infantry, and Stryker BCTs. A division's primary role is as a tactical headquarters commanding brigades in decisive action. BCTs are dependent upon the enabling capabilities at division and corps level.

Key functions of a division:

- Conduct shaping operations within the division AO
- Task-organize and employ BCTs and multifunctional and functional brigades
- Mass effects at decisive points (focus BCTs, multifunctional brigades, functional brigades, and joint capabilities)
- Allocate resources and set priorities
- Leverage joint capabilities

The remainder of this section outlines the capabilities and typical organization of multifunctional and functional brigades. Theater armies, corps, and divisions may be task-organized with an assortment of these units in order to support operations.




Figure 2-4. Division task organized for large-scale combat operations

## Army Capabilities by Warfighting Function:




Figure 2-8. The commander's role in the operations process

At each echelon, commanders and staff utilize the operations process to direct and synchronize subordinate echelons. The staff often organizes itself according to one of the warfighting functions of:

- Mission Command
- Movement and Maneuver
- Intelligence
- Fires
- Sustainment
- Protection

Each echelon conducts the operations process with staffs split across several command posts. The position of command posts and staff composition impacts the priority of effort at each command post as well as inherent staff capabilities at each command post. There are six command posts across the echelons.

1. **Main Command Post (CP)** – the unit's principle CP serving as the primary location for plans, analysis, sustainment coordination, and assessment. This CP is larger in size and less mobile than the tactical CP.
2. **Contingency Command Post** – a facility tailored from the theater army headquarters that enables a command to conduct crisis response and limited contingency operations within an AOR.
3. **Operational Command Post** – used to control operations for a limited period or for a small-scale

Table 2-2. Command post by echelon and type of unit

Echelon or Type of Unit	Description	Command Posts
Theater army	A theater army headquarters is the Army Service component command assigned to a geographic combatant commander. It is organized, staffed, and equipped to perform three roles: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Theater army for a geographic combatant commander.</li> <li>• Joint task force headquarters (with augmentation) in crisis response and limited contingency operations.</li> <li>• Joint force land component headquarters (with augmentation) for crisis response and limited contingency operations.</li> </ul>	Main command post (CP) Contingency CP Mobile command group
Field army	A field army headquarters is the Army component assigned to a subordinate unified command. The field army headquarters is staffed and equipped to perform three roles: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Army component and ARFOR for a subordinate unified commander.</li> <li>• Joint force land component headquarters (with augmentation) for large-scale combat operations.</li> <li>• Joint task force headquarters (with augmentation) for crisis response and limited contingency operations.</li> </ul>	Main CP Operational CP Mobile command group
Corps	A corps headquarters is the Army's most versatile headquarters. The corps headquarters is staffed and equipped to— <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Serve as the joint force land component commander (or multinational) headquarters (with augmentation) in crisis response and limited contingency operations.</li> <li>• Serve as a joint task force headquarters in a crisis response or limited contingency operation.</li> <li>• Serve as a tactical headquarters in large-scale combat operations.</li> </ul>	Main CP Tactical CP Support area CP Early entry CP Mobile command group
Division	A division headquarters operates as a tactical headquarters under operational control of an Army corps or Marine expeditionary force headquarters. The division headquarters is staffed and equipped to— <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Serve as a tactical headquarters in large-scale combat operations.</li> <li>• Serve as the joint force land component headquarters (or multinational) headquarters (with augmentation) in crisis response and limited contingency operations.</li> <li>• Serve as a joint task force headquarters in a crisis response or limited contingency operation.</li> </ul>	Main CP Tactical CP Support area CP Early entry CP Mobile command group
Brigade combat team	The brigade combat team headquarters operates as a tactical headquarters normally under operational control of an Army division.	Main CP Tactical CP +Mobile command group
Multifunctional brigade	A multifunctional brigade headquarters coordinates support for brigade combat teams and other forces.	Main CP Tactical CP
Functional brigades and battalions	Functional brigade and battalion headquarters coordinate a single function or capability.	Main CP Tactical CP
Combined arms and infantry battalions	Combined arms and infantry battalion headquarters operate as tactical headquarters assigned or attached to a brigade combat team.	Main CP Tactical CP Combat trains CP Field trains CP

contingency and relies upon the main CP for detailed planning, analysis, and special staff support.

4. **Tactical Command Post** – designed to control portions of an operation for a limited time; it is fully mobile and includes only essential Soldiers and equipment.
5. **Support Area Command Post (SACP)** – enables division and corps commanders to exercise mission command over disparate and functionally focused elements operating within the support and consolidation areas which might exceed the effective span of control of the MEB or division and corps main CPs.
6. **Early-Entry Command Post** – a lead element of a headquarters and designed to control operations until the remaining portions of the headquarters are deployed and operational (not a separate section of unit's table of organization and equipment).

### **Training for LSCO:**

Training is the most important thing the Army does to prepare for operations, and it is the cornerstone of combat readiness. Effective training and unit leader development must be commander driven, rigorous, realistic, and to the standard and under the conditions that units are expected to have to fight in, which includes joint and multinational operations. Units execute effective individual and collective training based on the Army's principles of training as described in ADRP 7-0.

Of note for sustainment concerns, sustaining units in the corps, division, and brigade AOs will incur significant risk due to the presence of conventional and hybrid threats. Sustainment units [assets] must be equipped, structured, trained, and prepared to execute reconnaissance and security tasks during large-scale combat operations to ensure they can complete sustainment missions when maneuver support is unavailable. *(Religious Support is a function of sustainment yet provides support across all the warfighting functions.)*

## Chapter Three – Operations to Shape

### RS Implications:

- RS assets will experience increased joint and multinational partner theater security cooperation activity.
- RS personnel will require more than a working knowledge of internal and external advisement as it pertains to religion, ethics, morals, and morality.
- Short notice and rapid deployment will require chaplain sections and UMTs to be prepared with load plans and detailed battle drills and SOPs to support self-sustained operations at echelon for 90-120 days.
- Chaplain sections and UMTs need to devise unit specific tools and methods for rapid religious area analysis in order to properly advise the command and staff.
- Chaplains need to hone religious service planning and delivery skills in phase 0 in order to ensure they are prepared to deliver RS without external assets and technology dependent services.

Operations to shape consist of various long-term military engagements, security cooperation, deterrence missions, tasks, and actions intended to assure friends, build partner capacity and capability, and promote regional stability. Operations to shape occur across the joint phasing model and focus on four purposes.




Figure 3-1. Shaping activities within an environment of cooperation and competition

1. Promoting and protecting U.S. national interests and influence.
2. Building partner capacity and partnerships.
3. Recognizing and countering adversary attempts to gain positions of relative advantage.
4. Setting conditions to win future conflicts.

The theater army integrates landpower within theater engagement plans and security cooperation activities. Army units at the


corps and lower echelons execute shaping tasks and provide the forces for security cooperation.

## Chapter Four – Operations to Prevent

### RS Implications:

- Chaplain sections and UMTs will likely conduct operations to prevent under severe time constraints. This requires the capability to deploy rapidly and arrive ready to conduct operations.
- RS personnel assigned to sustainment units might staff RSOI locations in a theater which requires an understanding of the process and the ability to provide appropriate counsel and advisement to personnel in the RSOI process.
- Tailored forces will require full chaplain sections and UMTs. This requires supervisory chaplains closely monitor and facilitate cross leveling of assets to include a time phased approach ensuring coverage throughout all phases of deployment from mobilization to redeployment.
- Operations to prevent involve considerations of local population impacts which requires external advisement from the chaplain section or UMT.

The purpose of operations to prevent is to **deter adversary actions** contrary to U.S. interests. They are typically conducted **in response** to activities that threaten unified action partners and require deployment or repositioning of credible forces in a theater to demonstrate the willingness to fight if deterrence fails. E.g., a GCC requests forces who then conduct a joint training exercises with the host nation. Prevent activities include:



+Figure 4-1. Examples of diplomatic, informational, military, and economic FDOs and FROs

### 1. flexible deterrent options (FDOs) and flexible response options (FROs)

### 2. Set the theater – establish favorable conditions for rapid execution of military operations and the support requirements for a specific OPLAN. (provide force HQ, force

protection, forward-stationing or rotational deployments, modernizing forward-stationed units.)

### 3. Tailor Army forces – select the right forces and deploying forces in the optimal sequence. Involves identifying, selecting, and sourcing required Army capabilities and establishing initial task organization to accomplish the mission in coordination with the GCC.




Figure 4-2. An overview of force tailoring

4. **Project the force** – project the military power into an operational area before an enemy or adversary is ready. This encompasses mobilization, deployment, employment, sustainment, and redeployment.

#### **Threat Considerations and Sustainment Planning:**

During operations to prevent, adversaries will threaten through a number of activities as resources shift towards information warfare and preclusion. Therefore, threats must be understood and mitigated with protection measures across all domains. Simultaneously, sustainment is a critical aspect of force projection and sustainment preparation of an OE serves as the base for sustainment planning. Whereas METT-TC is generally used to describe the operational environment, sustainment preparation of the operational environment considers: geography, supplies and services, facilities, maintenance, transportation, general skills, operational contract support, theater support contracts, external support contractors, system support contracts, Army pre-positioned stocks, and host nation support

#### **Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, and Integration:**

Deployment of forces involves the movement of troops with adequate protection of personnel and equipment into an AOR. Once in the AOR, the theater army or designated sustainment unit is responsible for conducting Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, and Integration (RSOI) activities.

#### **Roles and responsibilities:**

The **Theater army** enables the GCC to employ land forces within the AOR and into specific operational areas. **Corps** headquarters may deploy into an operational area as a **tactical headquarters** with subordinate divisions and brigades as a show of force. **Divisions and brigades** demonstrate national resolve by presenting a **credible coercive force**.

#### **Consolidation of Gains:**

The primary consolidation of gains activities during operations to prevent are those taken to ensure that Army planning accounts for tasks that enable the consolidation of gains. This planning should include considering follow-on forces, the manner in which they interact with the local populations and host-nation forces. Should operations to prevent transition to large-scale combat operations, forces responsible for consolidation of gains should be positioned to rapidly respond to the needs of the population.

## Chapter Five – Large-Scale Combat Operations (LSCOs)

### **RS Implications:**

- The complex, lethal, ambiguous, and rapid nature of LSCO requires an emphasis in all training on high casualty rates and the ability to provide RS under dynamic and complex conditions.
- The potential of adversarial utilization of weapons of mass destruction in LSCO requires knowledge, training, and familiarity with casualty care (wounded and KIA) for RS personnel.
- Operations in urban areas requires advisement and RS focus on facilitating moral leadership training and ethical reasoning development during phase 0 and all collective training events. This includes the introduction of ethical dilemmas in training scenarios.
- Analog navigation skills are required training in preparation for LSCO effects.
- RS personnel must integrate into the planning process in order to adequately understand various security operations, their impact upon movement, potential impact upon troops and equipment, and subsequent RS demands.
- RS of forcible entry operations requires anticipation of requirements and delivery of RS prior to operations as well as certified training for RS personnel and sequenced movement of RS assets into forcible entry operations in order to rapidly provide RS forward.
- Consolidation of gains in LSCO requires flexible RS plans and clear identification of priorities of RS across subordinate units in order to support both consolidation of gains and continued operations in the close area.
- Consolidation of gains will likely include coordination with local civilian religious leaders to provide RS for dislocated civilians and facilitating shared understanding towards unity of effort in humanitarian assistance.

### **Overview of Large-Scale Combat Operations:**

The joint force commander (JFC) seeks decisive advantage by using all available elements of combat power to exploit the initiative, deny enemy objectives, defeat enemy capabilities to resist, and compel desired behavior. **The presence of and potential use of weapons of mass destruction by enemy forces in LSCO** is a grave concern for the JFC. The Army provides the JFC operationally significant and sustained power. LSCOs introduce levels of complexity, lethality, ambiguity, and speed to military operations not common in other operations.

The Army supports the joint force by providing capability and capacity for the application of land power through maneuver, fires, special operations, cyberspace operations, electronic warfare, space operations, sustainment, and area security. In LSCO against a peer threat, commanders conduct decisive action to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative. Army forces defeat enemy organizations, control terrain, protect populations,

and preserve joint force and unified action partner freedom of movement and action in the land and other domains.

**Corps and divisions** execute decisive action tasks, where offensive and defensive tasks make up the preponderance of activities. **BCTs and subordinate echelons** concentrate on performing offensive and defensive tasks and necessary tactical enabling tasks. They do not conduct operationally significant consolidate gains activities unless assigned that mission in a consolidation area. Corps and division headquarters assign purposefully task-organized forces designated consolidation areas to begin consolidate gains activities concurrent with LSCOs.

It is likely that Army forces will be required to defend against enemy forces with locally superior capabilities at the beginning of LSCOs. These operations might occur inside urban areas within the JOA or theater of operations where currently more than 50 percent of the world's population lives. This is anticipated to shift to 70 percent by 2050, making **LSCOs in cities** likely. In most urban operations, the terrain, the dense population, military forces, and unified action partners will further complicate the arrangement of forces according to purpose, time, and space.

Threats from adversaries attack all domains seeking positions of relative advantage. Enemy commanders may use long-range missiles and rockets, advanced air defense, sensor and EW weapons, unmanned aircraft systems, precision-guided artillery, area denial munitions, directed energy weapons, and jamming or disruption of global positioning systems.

### **Tactical Enabling Tasks (Offense and Defense):**

Commanders direct tactical enabling tasks to support the performance of all offensive, defensive, and stability tasks. The tactical enabling tasks are: reconnaissance, security, troop movement, relief in place, passage of lines, encirclement operations, and mobility and countermobility operations.

1. **Reconnaissance** – a mission undertaken to obtain, by visual observation or other detection methods, information about the activities and resources of an enemy or adversary, or to secure data concerning the meteorological, hydrographic, or geographic characteristics of a particular area.
2. **Security** – those operations undertaken by a commander to provide early and accurate warning of enemy operations, to provide the force being protected with time and maneuver space within which to react to the enemy.
3. **Troop Movement** – ability of a commander to posture friendly forces for a decisive or shaping operation depends on the commander's ability to move that force.
4. **Relief in Place** – an operation in which, by the direction of higher authority, all or part of a unit is replaced in an area by the incoming unit and the responsibilities of the replaced elements for the mission and the assigned zone of operations are transferred to the incoming unit.

5. **Passage of Lines** – an operation in which a force moves forward or rearward through another force’s combat positions with the intention of moving into or out of contact with the enemy.
6. **Encirclement Operations** – where one force loses its freedom of maneuver because an opposing force is able to isolate it by controlling all ground lines of communication and reinforcement.
7. **Mobility Operations** – Freedom to move and maneuver within an AO is essential to the application of combat power and achieving results across the range of military operations. As OEs present challenges, commanders employ combined arms mobility and countermobility operations in support of operations.

#### **Forcible Entry Operations:**

Forcible entry is the seizing and holding of a military lodgment in the face of armed opposition or forcing access into a denied area to allow movement and maneuver to accomplish the mission. Army forces, as part of a joint force, must be capable of deploying and fighting to gain access to geographic areas controlled by hostile forces. There are three types of forcible entry operations: amphibious, airborne, and air assault. Forcible entry operations are complex

#### **Transition to Consolidation of Gains:**

Army forces provide the JFC the ability to capitalize on operational success by consolidating gains. Army forces consolidate gains in support of a host nation and its civilian population, or as part of the pacification of a hostile state. These gains may include the establishment of public security temporarily by using the military as a transitional force, the relocation of displaced civilians, reestablishment of law and order, performance of humanitarian assistance, and restoration of key infrastructure. Concurrently, corps and divisions must be able to accomplish these missions and direct/support continued operations in the close area.

## Chapter Six – Large-Scale Defensive Operations

### **RS Implications:**

- Defensive operations require RS plans focused on immediate transition during steady state operations.
- RS assets maneuver plans should consider the potential loss of geographic lines of communication.
- Higher headquarters chaplain sections and UMTs require situational understanding of RS asset movement and locations in order to facilitate area coverage in the event of defensive operations with isolated units with co-located RS assets.
- Forward deployed RS assets need to develop battle drills and SOP tasks focused on rapid retrograde operations which factor in proper inventory and security of sacred items.

### **General Discussion of Defense:**

A defensive task is a task conducted to defeat an enemy attack, gain time, economize forces, and develop conditions favorable for offensive and stability tasks. Essentially, defense provides commanders time to build combat power and **establish conditions for transition to the offense**. The strengths of a defense include the defender's ability to occupy positions before an attack and use the available time to prepare for those defenses. Characteristics of a defense include *disruption, flexibility, maneuver, mass and concentration, operations in depth, preparation, and security*. There are three primary defensive tasks: **area defense, mobile defense, and retrograde**.

### **How an Enemy May Attack:**

Enemy forces typically will mask the location of their main effort with multiple fixing attacks on the ground while using fires to disrupt critical friendly nodes and isolate friendly forward units. They will then reinforce success, massing capabilities at a perceived point of vulnerability. This is done through massing of fires with follow-on ground forces. This necessitates that **rotational and forward stationed Army forces are able to fight outnumbered and win**.

### **Planning and Preparing Corps and Division Defenses:**

Defending corps and division commanders seek to gain the advantage in multiple domains and the information environment when the enemy initially has the initiative. Subsequently, Corps and division orders of the defense include the minimum control measures required to coordinate the operation. Corps and divisions proactively employ security forces to protect the force from surprise, collect information, and preserve freedom of action.

**Consolidation of Gains in the Defense:** There are limited consolidation of gains activities during defensive operations.

## Chapter Seven – Large-Scale Offensive Operations

### RS Implications:


- The lethal nature of offensive operations, combined with speed and control measures requires that RS personnel understand the synchronization of tasks and geographic control measures as they impact freedom of movement, casualty flow routes, and prioritization of pre, during, and post offense RS.
- This phase likely incurs the highest anticipated casualty rates for friendly forces, thereby necessitating an intentional area and node RS coverage plan by supervisory chaplain sections and UMTs.
- Pre-offensive operations RS provision and advisement on ethics, morals, morale, and religion cannot be underestimated in offensive operations.
- The ability for RS personnel to synchronize efforts, movement, and communication of reports is pivotal to successful delivery of RS, especially in light of potential for all PACE communication plans to falter at various points in the conduct of offensive operations. This requires training on all communication platforms and the ability to identify and utilize several movement plans.

### General Discussion of Offense:

An offensive task is a task conducted to defeat and destroy enemy forces and seize terrain, resources, and population centers. Offense is the most direct and sure means of seizing, retaining, and exploiting the initiative to gain physical, temporal, and cognitive advantages and achieve definitive results. Army corps and divisions conduct offensive tasks within a broad operational scheme. Offense is characterized by **audacity**, **concentration**, **surprise**, and **tempo**. The offense emphasizes the requirement for a balance of **high tempo** and **synchronization** to mitigate current capabilities gaps (fires, EQ, Cyber, CBRN, mobility, and sustainment).

### How an Enemy Force May be Arrayed:

During defensive tasks, the enemy typically attempts to slow and disrupt friendly forces with a combination of obstacles, prepared positions, and favorable terrain so that they




+Figure 7-1. Enemy battle handover from disruption forces to contact forces

can be destroyed with massed fires. The enemy is likely to defend in depth, and when provided time, will continuously improve positions in ways that better protect enemy defending units, make attacks against them more costly, and allow the enemy to commit the minimum amount of ground combat power forward.

### Corps and Division Planning for Offense:

The Army's framework for exercising mission command is the operations process. Corps and divisions plan their battles within AOs assigned by their higher headquarters. The corps or division commander structures an AO using the operational framework to assign objectives, boundaries, phase lines (PLs), and other control measures and authorities within that AO to ensure the successful synchronization and timely convergence of subordinate and supporting formations and capabilities against the enemy. Corps and division subordinate units remain **dispersed** until immediately before commencement of the offense.




+Figure 7-4. Example penetration followed by exploitation

### Forms of Maneuver and Four Offensive Tasks:

Forms of maneuver are distinct tactical combinations of fire and movement with a unique set of doctrinal characteristics that differ primarily in the relationship between the maneuvering force and the enemy. The Army has six forms of maneuver:

1. **Envelopment** – four varieties of maneuver in which an attacking force seeks to avoid the principle enemy defenses by seizing objectives behind those defenses that allow the targeted enemy force to be destroyed in their current positions. (Focused on terrain at the tactical level.)



+Figure 7-5. Example of a single envelopment

2. **Flank attack** – a maneuver directed at the flank (left or right side) of an enemy designed to minimize the effect of the enemy's frontally oriented combat power, usually in conjunction with a supporting effort directed at the enemy's front by maneuver or fire.





Figure 7-7. Flank attack

3. **Frontal attack** – a maneuver in which an attacking force seeks to destroy a weaker enemy force or fix a larger enemy force in place over a broad front; most often utilized in a contiguous operational framework.



+Figure 7-8. Frontal attack

4. **Infiltration** – maneuver in which an attacking force conducts undetected movement through or into an area occupied by enemy forces to occupy a position of advantage behind those enemy positions while exposing only small elements to enemy defensive fires.




Figure 7-11. An example of a corps penetration

5. **Penetration** – maneuver in which an attacking force seeks to rupture enemy defenses on a narrow front to disrupt the defensive system.

6. **Turning Movement** – maneuver in which the attacking force seeks to avoid the enemy's principle defense positions by seizing objectives behind the enemy's current positions thereby causing the enemy force to move out of their current positions or divert major forces to meet the threat.




Figure 7-13. Example of a corps turning movement




Figure 7-15. Example of a corps movement to contact





Figure 7-22. Example of a corps in a pursuit

And four primary offensive tasks:

1. **Movement to contact** – an offensive task designed to develop the situation and establish or regain contact; employs purposeful and aggressive reconnaissance and security operations to gain contact with the enemy main body and develop the situation.
2. **Attack** – an offensive task that destroys or defeats enemy forces, seizes and secures terrain, or both; incorporates coordinated movement supported by fires.
3. **Exploitation** – the bold continuation of an attack to maximize success, forces drive swiftly for deep objectives, seizing enemy command posts, severing enemy escape routes, and striking at enemy reserves, artillery, and logistics units to prevent the enemy from reorganizing and effective defense.
4. **Pursuit** – the relentless destruction of retreating enemy forces who have lost the capability to effectively resist.


### Consolidation of Gains in the Offensive:

Consolidation of gains might be a transition to a sequel or branch as the result of advancement or enemy reaction. The transition to a focus on the conduct of area security and stability tasks from the conduct of offensive tasks cannot be an afterthought.


## Chapter Eight – Operations to Consolidate Gains

### RS Implications:

- Consolidation of gains requires an increased emphasis on external advisement to the command in terms of religion, ethics, morals, and morale as they impact the formation and operations.
- RS assets should anticipate potential conflict among troops transitioning from LSCO to operations to consolidate gains as interaction with host nation personnel increases.
- RS assets should prepare for redeployment operations and integrate with the staff for planning and execution of the deployment cycle support tasks associated with redeployment and post-redeployment.
- RS assets focus on internal advisement should focus on family issues, single Soldier issues, as well as potential conflict with sustainment unit personnel as part of the redeployment process.
- RS assets supporting theater movement control assets should anticipate heightened stress and increase workloads for these personnel amid potential for negative perceptions from redeploying personnel/units.



**Consolidating gains during  
large-scale combat operations**



**Consolidating gains at the  
culmination of LSCO**

### Overview of Operations to Consolidate Gains:

Consolidations of gains are the activities to make enduring any temporary operational success and set the conditions for a stable environment allowing for a transition of

control to legitimate authorities. Operations to consolidate gains exploit tactical and operational success by destroying or defeating enemy means for protracted resistance and denying his operational purpose. Commanders employ defeat mechanism and **four stability mechanisms**; *compel, control, influence, and support*. Consolidation of gains is **not a synonym for stability**.

### Threats and Challenges to Consolidation of Gains:

An enemy or adversary attempts to prevent effective consolidation of gains in order to gain time for a favorable political settlement, set conditions for protracted resistance, and alter the nature of the conflict to suit its positions of relative advantage. An enemy or adversary will target both friendly forces and populations in a variety of ways utilizing all available domains.

### Consolidation Activities and Roles by Echelon:

Divisions and corps designate a consolidation area when appropriate, generally during offensive operations. The force assigned is additive (BCT for a division, division for a Corps.) Divisions and corps may eventually transition the bulk of combat power to consolidate gains as large-scale combat operations end and the **operational focus changes**. Commanders conduct tactical tasks (such as search and attack, cordon and search, etc.) as necessary to stabilize an area.

1. **Search and attack** – a technique for conducting a movement to contact that shares many of the characteristics of an area security mission in order to accomplish one or more of the following purposes: destroy the enemy, deny the area, protect the force, and collect information.




Figure 8-2. Search and attack

2. **Cordon and search** – a technique of conducting a movement to contact that involves isolating a target area and search suspected locations within that target area to capture or destroy possible enemy forces and contraband.




Figure 8-3. Cordon and search

3. **Stability Tasks** – operations focused on stability seek to stabilize the environment enough so that the host nation can begin to resolve root causes of conflict and state failure. Six tasks comprise stability tasks: establish civil security, establish civil control, restore essential services, support governance, support economic and infrastructure development, and conduct security cooperation.

#### **Corps Tasks:**

Manages division and brigade consolidation of gains while anticipating, planning, and shaping the next areas targeted for these operations. Corps headquarters request the additional forces necessary to consolidate gains and allocate them to divisions. As LSCOs conclude, the corps reorganizes the AO into appropriate areas in order to facilitate rapid consolidation of gains. Operations primarily focus on providing area security in high threat areas, followed by the performance of stability tasks in lower threat areas.

#### **Division Tasks:**

Consider the impact of simultaneously conducting consolidation of gains activities and LSCO throughout all phases of their plans and manage BCTs as they establish area security and perform stability tasks through the division consolidation areas. Divisions are the first tactical echelon with a dedicated staff trained to synchronize the actions of information-related capabilities.

**Brigade Combat Teams and Task Forces:**

These units perform most area security tasks, and they facilitate the accomplishment of most stability tasks in concert with unified action partners.

**Transition:**

The transfer of an AO to a legitimate authority relieves the land force of area security and stability tasks and represents a transition from operations to consolidate gains to shape or prevent. The theater army resumes the tasks necessary to sustain the gains consolidated during LSCO as it coordinates the redeployment of Army forces out of theater.

## Appendix A – Command and Support Relationships

“Army command and support relationships are the basis for building Army task organizations. Certain responsibilities are inherent in the Army’s command and support relationships.” (p. A-3) The Army defines four support relationships with corresponding inherent responsibilities.

Table A-3. Army support relationships

If relationship is—	Then inherent responsibilities—							
	Have command relationship with—	May be task-organized by—	Receive sustainment from—	Are assigned position or an area of operations by—	Provide liaison to—	Establish and maintain communications with—	Have priorities established by—	Can impose on gained unit further support relationship of—
Direct support <sup>1</sup>	Parent unit	Parent unit	Parent unit	Supported unit	Supported unit	Parent unit; supported unit	Supported unit	See note <sup>1</sup>
Reinforcing	Parent unit	Parent unit	Parent unit	Reinforced unit	Reinforced unit	Parent unit; reinforced unit	Reinforced unit; then parent unit	Not applicable
General support-reinforcing	Parent unit	Parent unit	Parent unit	Parent unit	Reinforced unit and as required by parent unit	Reinforced unit and as required by parent unit	Parent unit; then reinforced unit	Not applicable
General support	Parent unit	Parent unit	Parent unit	Parent unit	As required by parent unit	As required by parent unit	Parent unit	Not applicable

Note. <sup>1</sup> Commanders of units in direct support may further assign support relationships between their subordinate units and elements of the supported unit after coordination with the supported commander.

Each of these relationships outline the relationship of a unit supporting another unit by virtue of capabilities the supported unit requires. Within **Direct Support (DS)** a field artillery unit is concerned primarily with fire support to only the supported unit. The field artillery unit is still task organized, commanded, and sustained by its parent unit. A

**reinforcing** unit is supporting a supporting unit, only like units provide reinforcement (i.e., air defense reinforcing air defense). [This precludes application of reinforcing from RS aside from a Chaplain Detachment (CD) B team reinforcing a CD A Team.] Similarly, the **general support reinforcing** relationship aligns like forces providing general support which presents the same exclusion for utilization for RS apart from CDs. **General Support (GS)** is that support provided to the supported force as a whole. The parent unit exercises command and control of all subordinate units and personnel. For sake of this query, DS and GS seem the only viable support relationship options. For RS planning, DS provides maximum flexibility for establishment of priorities by the supported unit commander and GS provides the least flexibility for the supported unit. One item of import when examining support relationships is understanding that **“support relationships are not a command authority...Commanders establish support relationships when subordination of one unit to another is inappropriate.”** (p. A-5) An example of this is when a brigade supports a battalion. It would be inappropriate to subordinate a brigade to a battalion.

To fully understand the impact of support relationships and their implications, one has to examine Army command relationships. “Army command relationships define superior and subordinate relationships between unit commanders. By specifying a chain of command, command relationships unify effort and enable commanders to use subordinate forces with maximum flexibility.” (p. A-3) The Army has five command

relationships outlined in a table for quick reference and understanding in Appendix A of FM 3-0.

These relationships provide the authority for task organization, administrative control, geographic positioning, priority establishment, and further command or support relationship demarcation. Organic units include those units operating according to TOE or TDA documents which create a hierarchical relationship. Within a brigade combat team, the battalions normatively assigned at home station to the brigade are most likely organic units. (FMSWeb queries can confirm organic relationships.)

Table A-2. Army command relationships

If relationship is—	Then inherent responsibilities:							
	Have command relationship with—	May be task organized by—	Unless modified, ADCON responsibility goes through—	Are assigned position or AO by—	Provide liaison to—	Establish and maintain communications with—	Have priorities established by—	Can impose on gained unit further command or support relationship of—
Organic	All organic forces organized with the HQ	Organic HQ	Army HQ specified in organizing document	Organic HQ	N/A	N/A	Organic HQ	Attached; OPCON; TACON; GS; GSR; R; DS
Assigned	Gaining unit	Gaining HQ	Gaining Army HQ	OPCON chain of command	As required by OPCON	As required by OPCON	ASCC or Service-assigned HQ	As required by OPCON HQ
Attached	Gaining unit	Gaining unit	Gaining Army HQ	Gaining unit	As required by gaining unit	Unit to which attached	Gaining unit	Attached; OPCON; TACON; GS; GSR; R; DS
OPCON	Gaining unit	Parent unit and gaining unit; gaining unit may pass OPCON to lower HQ?	Parent unit	Gaining unit	As required by gaining unit	As required by gaining unit and parent unit	Gaining unit	OPCON; TACON; GS; GSR; R; DS
TACON	Gaining unit	Parent unit	Parent unit	Gaining unit	As required by gaining unit	As required by gaining unit and parent unit	Gaining unit	TACON; GS; GSR; R; DS


Note. In NATO, the gaining unit may not task-organize a multinational force. (See TACON.)

ADCON	administrative control	HQ	headquarters
AO	area of operations	N/A	not applicable
ASCC	Army Service component command	NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
DS	direct support	OPCON	operational control
GS	general support	R	reinforcing control
GSR	general support-reinforcing	TACON	tactical control

Assigned units are those units in a relatively permanent command relationship which generally includes administrative control (ADCON). Units are often attached for an operation or task and assume ADCON and sustainment responsibilities for attached units.

Operational control (OPCON) and tactical control (TACON) are generally short term relationships established for sake of unity of effort. An example of this is a Patriot ADA battalion attached to a division for an operation where an Army Air and Missile Defense Command (AAMDC) exercises TACON over all missile engagements. Sustainment, administrative control, and assignment of land comes from the division while authority to engage an inbound missile or air breathing threat comes from the AAMDC. Understanding the impact of both relationships and the orders process is pivotal to successful delivery of RS. Take the scenario below as an example.

The corps headquarters in this design has three organically assigned divisions. There is no need to delineate support relationships for organically assigned units unless the corps wants to reorganize organically assigned units. In which case, there are no restrictions. The corps has similar authorities and flexibility regarding attached units. OPCON units remain ADCON to their parent unit and task organization and communications requirements are shared by the corps and their respective parent units.



Units in direct or general support are more complex in regards to authorities and priorities. The support relationships outline authorities exercised by either the parent or supported units. As stated earlier, DS is the least restrictive for the supported unit while GS is the most restrictive for the supported unit.

As Chaplain sections and UMTs plan and execute RS across an AO, it is imperative to understand the command relationships as these form the basis for OPORD, FRAGOs, and TASKORDs. However, understanding the support relationships is also a key element. For example, a sustainment brigade (SBDE) organically assigned to the TSC providing direct support to the Corps in a division's assigned area of responsibility contains UMTs who might be available for area coverage as part of a consolidated religious support plan at a specific location. The division chaplain needs to research the unit to which the

SBDE is providing DS. That unit has the authority to establish priorities for the SBDE and their subordinate units. If the DS is to the corps, the division chaplain section is required to coordinate tasking of the SBDE through the corps. If the SBDE is providing DS to the division, the division G3 is the place to coordinate tasking of the SBDE UMTs by means of the orders production process.

CDs are a unique augmentation entity within the design above. Some CDs are assigned/attached to a division or corps. Each corps requests a CD-C team to augment the corps chaplain section and divisions likewise request a CD-D team (FM 1-05, Religious Support, October 2012, p. 3-5) in synchronization with the global force management process. However, the ability to task organize or modify the command or support relationship still depends upon whether that CD is assigned, attached, OPCON, or TACON. [It is important to note that utilizing a CD in a manner which is inconsistent with doctrinal design could result in loss of those assets under subsequent iterations of Total Army Analysis; e.g., splitting CD-D teams in order to fill vacant positions across the employed force.] When requesting a CD as part of the global force management process, units are best served through requesting assignment or attachment to the echelon submitting the request IAW FM 1-05, paragraph 3-18.

In summary, command relationships form the foundational understanding from which to coordinate RS in conjunction with an understanding of support relationships. Command relationships are the system utilized to produce orders at the appropriate level while support relationships facilitate an understanding of the proper command element requiring coordination to facilitate establishment of priorities and memorandums of agreement or understanding.

## Appendix B – Risk Considerations

All operations contain inherent risk and commanders utilize various tools to mitigate that risk. Appendix B provides a list of questions for commanders to consider in mitigating that risk.

**Table B-1. Risk considerations**

<i>Commander's risk considerations</i>
How much combat power the main effort receives and why? (Commanders confirm the task organization annex. Subordinate units strictly follow the parameters of command or support relationships outlined in appendix A of this manual.)
Is sufficient guidance provided to empower, provide vision and purpose, and set conditions for the team to succeed? (Commanders drive the operations process through understanding, visualizing, describing, directing, leading, and assessing.)
Where does the commander best command the organization? (The commander's presence can mitigate confusion in combat and prevent the headquarters from losing focus.)
What authorities exist to empower subordinate commanders to build relationships of trust with unified action partners and local officials within their assigned area of operations? (Leaders need to build those relationships. Commanders should consider any obstacles to building those relationships, regardless of how slight, as having the potential to disrupt combat operations.)
How can commanders ensure that their staffs do not overclassify products? (Overclassification slows shared understanding with unified action partners.)
How does the unit move into positions of advantage in restricted terrain without being heavily disrupted by enemy assets? (Units observed by enemy forces can be engaged. Units engaged by an enemy on the enemy's terms can be destroyed.)
Are staffs at higher echelons enabling parallel planning across all echelon headquarters? (Staffs need to take full advantage of liaison officers. They should also use digital systems to share planning information with the staffs of subordinate, supporting, and supported staffs, if digital connectivity exists.)
Are processes in place to allow staffs to interact with the unit commander and extract the commander's intent and overall visualization when problems are identified? (The staff battle rhythm needs to provide the staff with time to interact with the commander during the day.)
Are staffs developing and rehearsing systems to ensure the flow of information from all sources to the respective staff functions and synchronization cells? (Chiefs of staff and executive officers are responsible for ensuring all echelons have a feedback mechanism to the headquarters, including special operations.)
Do the efforts of special staff officers support the scheme of maneuver and the information narrative? (This should occur without placing excessive demands on subordinate commanders.)
Does the staff use simulation and gaming techniques to refine or synchronize operations as part of different rehearsal exercises across echelons and across domains? (This requires elements of the staff to operate as a red team to subject important parts of the plan to examination.)
Is the staff seeking synchronization across multiple domains? (Staffs determine windows when, either because of battle rhythm or effects, an enemy's collection or lethal effects capability is limited. Staffs recommend those windows of time for movements or attacks by subordinate units.)
What operations security considerations are most important for reducing risk to friendly forces? (This requires an accurate knowledge of enemy information collection means and capabilities on the part of the assistant chief of staff, intelligence (G-2) and battalion or brigade intelligence staff officer (S-2) and protection cell staffs.)
When and where could military deception operations best reduce friendly vulnerabilities while creating enemy dilemmas? (This requires an accurate knowledge of enemy information collection means and capabilities. It also requires an understanding of how the targeted enemy decision maker receives and processes information in addition to that leader's frame of reference.)